Economics Working Papers

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https://hdl.handle.net/1794/49

This collection contains papers in the University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers series. Papers in this series are also available on the department's web site at: http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/oreuoecwp/

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Browsing Economics Working Papers by Subject "Antidumping"

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    Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Antidumping Policy: Theory and Evidence
    (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-07-01) Blonigen, Bruce A.; Park, Jee-Hyeong
    Antidumping (AD) duties are calculated as the difference between the foreign firm’s product price in the export market and some definition of "normal" or "fair" value, often the foreign firm’s product price in its own market. Additionally, AD laws allow for recalculation of these AD duties over time in what are known as an administrative review process. This paper examines for the first time the resulting dynamic pricing problem of a foreign firm that faces such an AD trade protection policy in its export market. When AD duties are certain for any dumping that occurs, we obtain the surprising result that dumping and AD duties should increase over time toward a stationary equilibrium value. Adding uncertainties prevalent in AD enforcement into our analysis changes these conclusions substantially and leads to more realistic testable implications. Firms with ex ante expectations that the probability of AD enforcement is low, or with expectations that the probability of a termination/VER (instead of AD duties) is high, will decrease their dumping and AD duties over time in the administrative review process once they face AD duties. Using detailed data from U.S. AD investigations filed from 1980- 1995, we find evidence consistent with these hypotheses stemming from our analysis with uncertain AD enforcement and provides empirical evidence consistent with James Anderson’s domino dumping hypothesis.
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    Self-Protection: Antidumping Duties, Collusion and FDI
    (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-11) Davies, Ronald B.; Liebman, Benjamin H., 1971-
    It is well established that the threat of antidumping duties can help sustain collusion between a foreign firm and its domestic counterpart. However, when the foreign firm is a multinational, its subsidiary will fight against a new duty, potentially making this threat hollow and collusion less likely. We show that the multinational may therefore choose to submit to a tariff even under collusion since evidence indicates that duties are more difficult to remove than initiate. In this way, it is possible to obtain a greater degree of commitment, although it comes at a cost. Nevertheless, we show that this can be a more profitable strategy than those previously explored. In fact, we find several cases where subsidiaries of multinational firms have indeed filed for protection from their own parents.