Slovic, Paul

Permanent URI for this collection

https://hdl.handle.net/1794/18931

Browse

Browsing Slovic, Paul by Subject "Behavior"

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Thumbnail Image
    ItemOpen Access
    Information processing, situation specificity, and the generality of risk-taking behavior
    (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972) Slovic, Paul
    An effort was made to construct two structurally similar risk-taking tasks in order to evaluate inter-task consistency of individual differences. Only the mode of response differed between tasks. In one task, subjects chose their preferred bet within each of a number of pairs of bets. In the other, they set selling prices for these same bets. A measure of the subject's preference for 'long shot' gambles was obtained from each response. Reliable individual differences were found for each measure. However, the inter-measure correlation was relatively low considering the high degree of similarity between tasks. It is argued that the two response modes triggered different methods of processing information about probabilities and payoffs in a way that perturbed individual differences and reduced inter-task consistency. Information-processing considerations may be one important component of the situation specificity prevalent in risk-taking behavior. These results imply that high correlations are unlikely between risk-taking measures in structurally different settings or between risk-taking and other behaviors.
  • Thumbnail Image
    ItemOpen Access
    Reversals of preference between bids and choices in gambling decisions
    (Journal of Experimental Psycholog, 1971) Slovic, Paul; Lichtenstein, Sarah
    Subjects in 3 experiments chose their preferred bet from pairs of bets, and later bid for each bet separately. In each pair, one bet had· a higher probability ·of winning (P bet); the other offered more to win (S bet). Bidding method (selling vs. buying) and payoff method (real­-play vs. hourly wage) were varied. Results showed that when the P bet was chosen, the$ bet o􀁙en received a higher bid. These inconsistencies violate every risky decision model, but can be understood via information-processing considerations. In bidding, S starts with amount to win and .adjusts it downward to account for other attributes of the bet. In choosing; there is no natural starting point. Thus amount to win dominates bids but not choices. One need not call this behavior irrational, but it casts doubt on the descriptive validity of expected utility models of risky decision making.