The Metaphysics and Phenomenology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Interpretive Investigatin into the Nature and Function of Simple Objects in Wittgenstein's Early Theory of Meaning
| dc.contributor.author | Warwick, Michael Charles | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-01-13T22:00:46Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-01-13T22:00:46Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1995-03 | |
| dc.description | 408 pages | |
| dc.description.abstract | If a "theory" of meaning is possible, what form must it take? This study of Wittgenstein's early work was undertaken with this question as its focus. My reinterpretation derives from a close study of the Tractatus and the Notebooks 1914-1916 in which Wittgenstein explores the conditions necessary to representation. The problem relation of language to the world should not be explicated in terms of concepts consequent on it - description, truth, and reference; neither should the theory adopt their presuppositions (concerning the form of reality). It is argued Wittgenstein eschews the practice of redefining those concepts in favor of explicating parallel ones. Propositions do not describe but show the conditions for representation which their forms are congruent with, not true of; for by showing those conditions propositions are not intentional (-ly representational), rather they make the intention to refer possible. This fundamental semantic relation I reinterpret as a linguistic form of intentionality that makes conceivable the universality of languages' representational potential to apply to any world whatsoever (dubbed "blind referencing"). The standard realist and anti-realist interpretations of Wittgenstein's position are criticized throughout though elements of each contribute to the solution I argue for. The conditions for representation Wittgenstein proposes - a subsisting realm of simple objects - are considered both directly and through an exploration of the notions of propositional analysis and of the context propositions provide for the meanings of names (part 1). The conclusions is that the core concept of "simple object" ("logical form", a variable) is infinitely analogically interpretable and phenomenological in character and in part 2 I explore parallels between Wittgenstein's views and Husserl's phenomenology with respite to their methodology and content - the nature of "objects" and the essential intentionality of representation. This conception of semantics is found to substantiate the Tractus's view of the common roots of logic and ethics. My conclusion concerns three issue: distinguishing Wittgenstein's philosophical views from those of empirical linguistics; I draw out some epistemological and ontological implications; finally I argue the failure of Wittgenstein's theory from the hindsight of his later criticism of the (philosophical) notions of "objectivity" and language as rule-governed. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1794/30332 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | University of Oregon | |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0-US | |
| dc.rights | UO theses and dissertations are provided for research and educational purposes and may be under copyright by the author or the author’s heirs. Please contact us <mailto:scholars@uoregon.edu> with any questions or comments. In your email, please be sure to include the URL and title of the specific items of your inquiry. | |
| dc.subject | philosophy, Wittgenstein, theory of meaning, logical manipulations, context, simplicity, phenomenology, linguistic phenomenology, Husserl | |
| dc.title | The Metaphysics and Phenomenology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Interpretive Investigatin into the Nature and Function of Simple Objects in Wittgenstein's Early Theory of Meaning | |
| dc.type | Thesis / Dissertation |